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I. INTRODUCTION
The corporate form limits the liability of shareholders and
other participants arising from the enterprise.1 This broad insulation
shields corporate participants not only from vicarious liability for the
acts of others, but even from liability for some of their own acts taken
in the corporate name. The liability that is avoided does not disap-
pear into a black hole; it falls onto another person. If the liability is
shifted to a tort victim, the use of the corporate form seems particu-
larly troublesome, permitting the enterprise to externalize part of the
cost of doing business. This limitation seems inconsistent with the
increased use of strict liability and other modern tort doctrines to
extend liability to the enterprise.2 Indeed, some believe that corporate
law undercuts tort law and represents a nineteenth-century relic that
should be swept away in the face of current tort learning.3
Evaluating this possible conflict requires consideration of both
corporate and tort law concepts. The impact of corporate law begins
with its language. The corporate form separates individual partici-
pants into shareholders, officers, and directors. This division reflects
1. Shareholders' limited liability generally is specified in a state corporations statute. See
Model Business Corp. Act § 6.22 (ABA, 1985). Liability of officers is defined by agency law;
officers as agents ordinarily are not liable for acts of their principal. See Part H.
2. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between
Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1345 (1982); Alan 0. Sykes, The
Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L. J. 1231 (1984).
3. Theresa A. Gabaldon, The Lemonade Stand: Feminist and Other Reflections on the
Limited Liability of Corporate Shareholders, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 1387, 1440 (1992) (stating, 'Oddly,
however, these themes [favoring industry and dating from the 19th century] have substantially
eroded in tort and contract law, yet they continue to be enshrined in corporate law."); Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts,
100 Yale L. J. 1879, 1920 (1991) (noting that, for involuntary creditors, limited liability prevents
tort law from fulfilling the function of allocating costs among actors). See also Janet Cooper
Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a Procedural Lens, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 387,
391 (1992) (stating that "[l]imited liability... threatens the animating principles of tort laws).
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the separation of function and specialization of effort, which are core
corporate characteristics. 4 Shareholders provide the equity capital for
the enterprise but do not participate in management, other than by
voting for directors or on fundamental corporate changes. 5 Officers
and directors manage the enterprise, but do not by virtue of their
positions have a claim to any residual gain from the enterprise. 6
In turn, this division shapes the discussion of individual liabil-
ity. Limited liability for shareholders, officers, and directors is the
norm in corporate law, but there are two major exceptions that break
down along the functional division just described. First, some statutes
hold managers personally liable for specified violations by their firms,
without reference to whether the managers also are shareholders.7
Second, the judicial doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, a frequent
means by which courts extend liability beyond the enterprise, focuses
on the liability of shareholders, thereby suggesting a concern with
participants who have the potential for economic gain even if they do
not have the ability to exercise control.s
Traditional tort concerns reinforce these functional exceptions
to limited liability. Tort law seeks to create incentives for an enter-
prise to control risks and to spread costs to more efficient risk-bear-
ers.9 Liability aimed at managers suggests that the incentive to con-
trol corporate actions is the principal focus of extending liability, since
corporate managers control an enterprise but may not be efficient
risk-bearers.1° Liability directed toward shareholders, particularly in
publicly held corporations in which investors are numerous and dis-
4. Corporate statutes identify separate roles for shareholders, officers, and directors that are
combined in one group in a partnership or proprietorship. This specialization permits the
enterprise to adapt to changed circumstances, a prized characteristic of the corporate form. See
Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr. and Robert B. Thompson, Corporations and Other Business Associations,
Cases and Materials 149-50 (Little, Brown, 1992).
5. See, for example, Model Business Corp. Act §§ 8.01, 7.28, 11.01 (cited in note 1).
6. See id. § 8.01(b) (stating that *[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by... its board of
directors'). See also id. § 8.40.
7. See, for example, Part IV.
8. See generally Stephen B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil (Clark Boardman
Callaghan, 1991).
9. Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1916 (cited in note 3) (stating that
"shareholder liability should be seen as a standard problem of tort law.... [W]hen are a corpora-
tion's shareholders cheaper cost avoiders and/or cheaper insurers than the persons who may be
injured by the corporation's activities?").
10. Managers typically have invested their human capital in one firm and cannot by
diversification protect themselves against risks specific to that firm; this lack of diversification
may cause them to be overly cautious in making decisions. See note 85 and accompanying text.
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persed, suggests an emphasis on distributive concerns such as the
ability to bear risk.11
In the real world, of course, legal categories do not overlap
perfectly with economic principles. Shareholders who have the claim
to the residual gain from the enterprise may lack a diversified portfo-
lio and thus not be particularly good risk-bearers. Liability placed on
such participants may be based on unjust enrichment or some sense of
fairness, or may simply reflect a political judgment that shareholders
should bear the loss. 12 Alternatively, since real world participants are
not limited to one corporate category, some participants will possess
both the control attributes of managers and the gain-sharing attrib-
utes of shareholders. In a closely held corporation, the same individu-
als often serve as shareholders, officers, and directors. 13 Parent-sub-
sidiary corporations within corporate groups provide a somewhat more
complicated example. The corporate parent receives the residual gain
from the enterprise and can exercise control through individual em-
ployees who serve as officers of the subsidiary. 14
Applying tort principles to these contexts, a stronger case can
be made to hold such participants liable for the acts of others as com-
pared to situations in which the individual is only a shareholder with-
out control or a manager without claim to any residual gain. Indeed,
these overlapping contexts encompass most modern examples of situ-
ations in which courts have extended liability beyond the enterprise
by piercing the corporate veil. 15 Yet owners of closely held businesses
or parent corporations within corporate groups regularly escape
liability for torts of the enterprise. 6 This result has been a recurring
concern of academic writers17 and has provoked a variety of proposals,
11. See Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1919 (cited in note 3) (arguing that 'if
tort law is to have any role in shifting risks to low-cost insurers, then using it to shift risks to the
equity market makes sense').
12. See notes 129-35 and accompanying text.
13. See, for example, F. Hodge O'Neal and Robert B. Thompson, 1 O'Neal's Close Corp. §
1.08 at 32 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 3d ed. 1992) (footnote omitted) (noting that close corpora-
tions often unite the decision-making function and the risk-bearing function in one group, the
shareholder-managers).
14. See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, The Corporate Entity in an Era of Multinational
Corporations, 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 283 (1990) (advocating use of enterprise theory instead of entity
theory to determine liability questions within corporate groups).
15. See generally Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil An Empirical Study, 76
Cornell L. Rev. 1036 (1991) (analyzing 1600 piercing-the-veil cases and finding no piercing to
reach shareholders in public corporations; use of the doctrine was limited to close corporations
and corporate groups).
16. See the results described in note 102 and accompanying text.
17. See Blumberg, 15 Del. J. Corp. L. at 328 (cited in note 14) (discussing the 'fundamental
inadequacy" of entity law); David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91
Colum. L. Rev. 1565, 1587 (1991) (footnote omitted) (stating that "we have [been] moving back
[from negligence toward] strict liability in tort, and arguably we should move away from limited
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including a call to hold even passive shareholders liable for the acts of
an enterprise.1 8
This Article addresses the question of when corporate partici-
pants should be liable for the acts of others. Part II's introductory
presentation of limited liability first examines the liability of manag-
ers who have control but no claim to the residual gain and then exam-
ines the liability of shareholders who share in the economic gain of the
enterprise but have little opportunity to control it. Part III presents
an overview of the theoretical underpinnings of limited liability and
again focuses on how the various arguments affect managers and
shareholders. Tort principles as applied in these contexts suggest a
limit on liability based only on status as an officer and nothing else or
on status as a shareholder and nothing else. Thus, Part IV disputes
the efficiency of the recent proposal by Professors Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman to reverse the current default rule in corporate
law and make shareholders liable for the torts of the enterprise.19
Neither ability to control nor distributive concerns of tort law supports
liability for passive shareholders. Similarly, there is reason to
question whether recent statutes that place additional liability on
managers in environmental and other areas, particularly for conduct
not involving their personal participation, will overdeter managers,
who are not the most efficient risk-bearers.
These statutes and case law by their language appear to im-
pose vicarious liability on shareholders or managers, when in fact
liability usually is limited to managers who participated directly in
the wrongful activity or combined control and profit-sharing. When
these holdings are expressed in the language of corporate law, with its
emphasis on the separate functions of shareholders and managers, the
results appear broader than intended. The overlap of investor and
manager functions permitted in the corporate form requires an un-
packing of the basis for tort liability.
Even with this clarification of language, there remains a per-
plexing judicial reluctance to hold a corporate parent liable for the
obligations of its subsidiaries when the parent possesses both the
opportunity to control and the potential to share in residual earnings
of a subsidiary.20 Even this result would not be inconsistent with tort
law to the extent that nonlegal alternatives provide sufficient
liability with respect to tort claimants as well'); Arden Doss, Jr., Note, Should Shareholders Be
Personally Liable for the Torts of Their Corporations? , 76 Yale L. J. 1190, 1191 (1967) (contending
that limited liability thwarts the objective of modern tort law).
18. See, for example, Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1896-99 (cited in note 3).
19. Id. at 1879.
20. See note 102 and accompanying text.
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incentives for the enterprise to take care. This Article discusses two of
these constraints: contract creditors' monitoring and managers'
causing the enterprise to purchase sufficient insurance. Together
these constraints may encourage an appropriate level of caution and
support a continued use of limited liability even for corporate groups. 21
II. How LIMITED LIABILITY WORKS: INSULATION FROM DIRECT AND
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
A. Corporate Norms
The creation of a corporation establishes a new entity, legally
recognized as separate from its participants. This separation offers
many advantages, such as facilitating the ownership and transfer of
collective property, but its most powerful effect is its insulation of
participants from financial responsibility for debts of the enterprise.
Indeed, limited liability may be the attribute most often associated
with the corporate form. However, limited liability is not absolute.
The limits of that concept can best be understood in the context of
another corporate characteristic, a norm which presumes the
separation of corporate functions between investors and managers.
All corporations statutes assume that a corporation will have
shareholders, directors, and officers. Each of these groups possesses
limited liability, but the result for each group rests on somewhat
different bases and the reach of limited liability is not coterminous for
each group.
B. Limited Liability of Managers
Officers are agents of the corporation who act for the entity in a
variety of day-to-day matters. Their existence and their duties usu-
ally are specified by corporations statutes, but any individual liability
for enterprise obligations derives primarily from the common law.22
21. See notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
22. Compare Model Business Corp. Act § 8.42, which was added in 1984 and thereafter
adopted in many states: "An officer is not liable for any action taken as an officer, or any failure
to take action if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with this section.' Model
Business Corp. Act § 8.42(d) (cited in note 1). The duty specified in the section refers to
"discretionary authority" and must be "(1) in good faith; (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and (3) in a manner he
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation." Id. § 8.42(a). This section does
not appear to have had any impact on the liability discussed in this Article.
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These principles, as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Agency,
usually insulate the officer.2 An individual who signs a contract on
behalf of the corporation is cloaked in the mantle of the enterprise and
is not personally liable for action taken in the corporate name.24 If the
enterprise defaults on an obligation under the contract, the creditor
normally cannot proceed against the individual.
However, the same individual who acts for the same corpora-
tion in the same capacity in taking action deemed tortious loses the
corporate cloak and is held individually liable along with the enter-
prise.25 Similarly, an officer, director, or shareholder who commits a
criminal act cannot avoid personal liability by claiming to act on be-
half of the enterprise. 26 As the regulatory state has grown, legisla-
tures have extended these principles in various regulatory acts, so
that a person who, as a corporate official, violates a specific federal or
state regulation is not shielded by the corporate entity.27
23. See Restatement (Second) of Agency §§ 354-357 (1958) (discussing liability for officers
who act without authority or who fail to disclose that they are contracting for a corporate
principal).
24. There are limits, of course, when individuals so intertwine personal and corporate
dealing that courts will pierce the veil or will consider the corporation as an agent for individuals.
Absent such unusual conduct, the individuals escape liability for their direct actions, which they
cannot do in tort.
25. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 343 (stating, 'An agent who does an act
otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the
principal or on account of the principal, except where he is exercising a privilege of the principal,
or a privilege held by him for the protection of the principal's interests or where the principal
owes no duty or less than the normal duty of care to the person harmed.'). See generally Henry
Winthrop Ballantine, Ballantine on Corporations 275 (Callaghan, rev. ed. 1946) (stating, '[A]n
officer or director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which he authorizes or directs or in
which he participates, notwithstanding that he acted as agent of the corporation and not on his
own behalf."). See, for example, Alexie, Inc. v. Old South Bottle Shop Corp., 179 Ga. App. 190, 345
S.E.2d 875, 879 (1986) (stating, 'In Georgia, where a corporate tort is committed, an officer who
takes part in its commission or who specifically directs the particular act to be done or who
participates or cooperates therein is personally liable for the commission of the tort.").
26. See, for example, Parish v. State, 178 Ga. App. 177, 342 S.E.2d 360 (1986) (holding that
a corporate officer could be held criminally liable for issuing a bad check, even though the check
was issued by the corporation on its corporate account, rather than by the officer as an in-
dividual). See also Cal. Penal Code § 387 (West Supp. 1993) (imposing liability on managers for
failing to disclose a corporation's hazards).
27. This has long been true of tax liability. The Internal Revenue Code has imposed direct
liability on the official responsible for collecting and forwarding to the government tax funds
withheld from employees' pay. See 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1988 & Supp. 1992). See, for example,
Thomsen v. United States, 887 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding the treasurer and vice.president of
a famly.owned corporation liable as a "responsible person' for purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 6672,
which penalizes the failure to collect and pay over withheld income taxes, even though the
treasurer owned no stock and delegated responsibility for financial matters, payment of creditors,
and payment of withholding taxes to another vice.president).
Additional liability is imposed under the securities laws on those who control, are controlled
by, or are under common control with the regulated entity. See the Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. § 77o (1988). The extension of liability in environmental and pension areas is discussed
below.
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Thus, as to direct participation, the corporate shield really only
works for contracts, 8 a narrowness of protection that may surprise
many entrepreneurs who intend to use corporations to avoid liability.29
Note, however, that the corporate form does insulate corporate par-
ticipants in a tort (or contract) setting against vicarious liability, a
point that remains central for later discussion in this Article.
Directors, unlike officers, are not agents of a corporation. State
corporations codes provide that a collective act of the board of directors
is the act of the corporation, but directors as individuals are separate
from the enterprise.30 Corporations statutes typically impose some
specific duties on boards of directors, such as a duty not to declare
dividends when the enterprise lacks available funds; however, absent
similar statutes, the individual directors are not liable for corporate
obligations. 1 Directors also have broad fiduciary duties to the corpo-
ration and to the shareholders, but these duties usually do not render
the directors liable for obligations of the enterprise.32
28. One possible exception to this assertion that the corporate insulation works only in
contracts with direct participants may be the fiduciary shield doctrine found at the intersection of
procedure, constitutional, and conflicts law. See, for example, Marine-Midland Bank, N.A v.
Miller, 664 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1981). Some courts have found that when a defendant's only
presence in the forum has been as a corporate official, the 'fiduciary shield" of corporate office
prevents the assertion of personal jurisdiction. See id. at 902. Such an application would be
consistent with the substantive law if limited to actions taken pursuant to contracts, but has
sometimes been extended to tortious or regulatory violations. See, for example, RF. Barron
Corp. v. Nuclear Relds (Australia) Ply., Ltd., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19857 (N.D. Bl. 1992)
(holding that the fiduciary shield protects a defendant in a fraud charge arising out of termination
of employment); Ryan v. Chayes Virginia, Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. App. Ct. 1990) (using the
fiduciary shield to dismiss a claim against the chairman (and sole shareholder) and the president
for wrongful termination). More commonly, courts refuse to apply the fiduciary shield in a tort
setting, thus subjecting the corporate officer to suit for tortious action taken in the corporate
name. See, for example, Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Co., 71 N.Y.2d 460, 522 N.E.2d 40, 527
N.Y.S.2d 195 (1988).
29. But see Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1626-27 (cited in note 17) (distinguishing liability
based on participation from liability based on ownership; the law permits limiting liability only
based on ownership).
This surprise about the narrowness of protection for individual participants from using the
corporate form probably arises because piercing the corporate veil dominates the legal discussion
of the limited liability issue. The language of piercing is language of shareholder liability.
Against a background of corporate norms that assume a separation of function between share-
holders who provide investment capital and officers and directors who manage the business,
piercing's constant discussion of shareholders obscures liability based on personal participation.
In close corporations in which the same participants serve as both managers and shareholders, a
court's decision to pierce the veil usually results in liability being directly imposed on managers,
although the language of the decision may suggest liability as shareholders. In that sense, the
failure of piercing cases to unpack the passive and active participants means that piercing cases
arising in tort may place liability on managers while appearing to place liability on shareholders.
30. See generally Harry G. Henn and John R. Alexander, Laws of Corporations 582-85
(West, 3d ed. 1983).
31. See, for example, Model Business Corp. Act § 8.33 (1985).
32. See, for example, id. § 8.30. These fiduciary duties normally are enforced by
shareholders and sometimes have been broadened to include creditors at or around the time of
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C. Limited Liability of Shareholders
Corporations statutes typically specify that shareholders will
not be liable for the obligations of the enterprise.33 Although such
limited liability was not found in many early American corporations, it
has been the statutory standard in most American jurisdictions since
the middle of the nineteenth century.3 4  Although statutes do not
specify exceptions to this insulation, courts regularly disregard the
entity or pierce the veil of the enterprise to hold the shareholders
liable.3 15 Courts often portray this remedy as drastic, and the standard
stated for piercing can best be described as open-ended. A typical
holding is that a court will pierce the veil if the separate entity "is
used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud or
defend crime .. ."36 While the legal test is phrased as imposing
liability on shareholders, the activity required to pierce the veil goes
well beyond the typical shareholder role as a passive provider of
capital. Courts generally refuse to impose liability on shareholders
unless they have control of the corporation and there has been misuse
of the corporate form, such as fraud, undercapitalization, or
intermingling of corporate and individual transactions.3 7 My study of
1600 piercing-the-veil cases found no case in which shareholders in a
public corporation were held liable and no civil case in which
individual shareholders identified as passive in corporations of any
size were held liable.3 8 Most successful piercing cases in the study
involved individuals who served as both shareholders and managers
or corporate groups in which the parent corporation was the
bankruptcy. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No.
12,150 (Del. Ch., Dec. 30, 1991), reprinted in 17 Del. J. Corp. L. 1099 (1992).
33. See, for example, Model Business Corp. Act § 6.22(b) (1985) (stating, 'unless otherwise
provided in the articles of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for
the acts or debts of the corporation except that he may become personally liable by reason of his
own acts or conduct"). Compare id. § 8.42 (discussed in note 22) and Part IV (discussing statutes
that address officer liability).
34. See Phillip I. Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. Corp. L. 573,
587-95 (1986) (describing early American laws providing for shareholder liability and the
movement to limited liability).
35. See Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1041 (cited in note 15).
36. United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis.
1905).
37. William M. Fletcher, 1 Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 43.10 at
758-59 (perm. ed. rev. vol., 1990), describes a three-part test used by many courts, which requires
(1) control; (2) use of control by the defendant to commit fraud or wrong, to perpetrate the
violation of a statutory or other duty, or to commit dishonest and unjust acts; and (3) that the
control and misuse proximately cause the plaintiffs injury.
38. Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1047 (cited in note 15).
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shareholder and could name the individuals who managed the
subsidiary.3 9
D. Summary of Limited Liability
Individuals who commit torts are personally liable even if they
act in the name of the corporation. However, non-participating indi-
viduals are insulated from liability for tortious acts by others in the
corporation, and no individual is liable for corporate obligations aris-
ing under contract, absent piercing of the corporate veil. Piercing the
corporate veil requires more than mere shareholder status and the
potential for gain from the enterprise; some affirmative misuse of the
corporate entity usually must be present.
In close corporations in which the same individuals are share-
holders as well as officers and directors, the result produced by direct
liability for tort, crime, or regulatory actions is the same as piercing
the veil to reach shareholders under traditional corporate law. When
the shareholder behind the veil actively participated in the act leading
to liability, there is no need to use piercing and indeed there are
relatively few cases involving torts within close corporations. Only
226 of 1600 piercing cases in the empirical study mentioned above
arose in a tort setting, and most of those tort cases arose in corporate
groups.40 In only ten of the cases outside of corporate groups did a
plaintiff seek to reach an individual defendant who directly
participated in the tort, and in another fifteen the plaintiff sought to
reach close corporation participants even though they were not di-
rectly involved in the tort.41  In situations in which the corporate
defendant is not insolvent, officers or directors are rarely sued indi-
39. In 637 cases involving corporate groups, courts pierced in 237 (37.21%). See Thompson,
76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1055 (cited in note 15). Of the 858 cases in which plaintiffs sought to reach
individual defendants, the individuals were described as being both shareholder and manager in
302 cases; piercing occurred in 140 or 45.90%. The court identified the defendant in a single
capacity as follows: shareholder in 489 cases (piercing in 205 or 41.34%); passive shareholder in 6
cases (piercing in 1 or 16.67%), see Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass.
1971)); officer in 52 cases (piercing in 22 or 42.31%); director in 9 cases (piercing in 4 or 44.44%).
The one case in which the court pierced the veil to an apparent passive shareholder was a
criminal case involving a corporate group in which there was significant indication of the parent
corporation's participation in the subsidiary.
40. See Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1058 (cited in note 15).
41. See F. Hodge O'Neal and Robert B. Thompson, O'Neal's Close Corporations: Law and
Practice § 111 n.2 (Clark Boardman Callaghan, 3d ed. 1992 rev.) (reporting that courts pierced in
one-half of the cases seeking to reach direct participants and in one-third of the cases in which
there was not direct participation). Of the 226 tort cases, 152 arose in corporate groups and 65 in
individually owned close corporations. Other than the 25 cases mentioned in the text, the close
corporation cases involved fact situations not directly raising liability questions for individual
shareholders.
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vidually, which likely further reinforces lack of recognition about
individual tort liability.42
Together, these doctrines give almost unbounded insulation for
passive shareholders and substantial insulation for active participants
so long as they do not directly participate in tortious or criminal acts.
Two cases illustrate the breadth of this insulation. In the well-known
taxi-cab case of Walkovszky v. Carlton,43 an entrepreneur formed a
series of corporations to engage in taxi service in New York City, each
with minimal assets, in a business in which injuries to third parties
might be expected. The New York Court of Appeals refused to hold
the shareholder liable when one of the cabs injured a pedestrian.
Judge Keating's dissent portrayed the corporate plan as an improper
device that should not insulate the controlling shareholder:
From their inception these corporations were intentionally undercapitalized
for the purpose of avoiding responsibility for acts which were bound to arise
as a result of the operation of a large taxi fleet having cars out on the street
24 hours a day and engaged in public transportation. And during the course
of the corporations' existence all income was continually drained out of the
corporations for the same purpose. 44
A similar example is Baatz v. Arrow Bar,45 in which the plain-
tiffs sought to recover from the shareholders of an incorporated bar
whose employee had served the drunken driver who caused the plain-
tiffs' serious injuries. The South Dakota court found the corporation
liable because of the court's earlier holding that it is negligence (for
civil liability purposes) as a matter of law46 when a person violates the
state's criminal provision banning sales of liquor to intoxicated per-
sons.47 In Baatz, the corporate licensee lacked sufficient assets to pay
the damages. The South Dakota Supreme Court upheld a summary
judgment dismissing as parties the husband, wife, and daughter, who
were the corporation's only shareholders. In depositions prior to the
trial, the husband described the decision to incorporate as based
"[u]pon advice of counsel, as a shield against individual liability."4S
The dissent described the court's message as, "Incorporate, mortgage
42. George W. Dent, Jr., Limited Liability in Environmental Law, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev.
151, 167 (1991) (noting that tort victims generally refuse to sue officers and directors).
43. 18 N.Y.2d 414,223 N.E.2d 6 (1966).
44. Id. at 11 (Keating, J., dissenting).
45. 452 N.W.2d 138 (S.D. 1990).
46. S.D. Cod. Laws § 35-4-78 (1992).
47. See Walz v. City of Hudson, 327 N.W.2d 120 (S.D. 1982).
48. Baatz, 452 N.W.2d at 143 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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the assets of a liquor corporation to your friendly banker, and proceed
with carefree entrepreneuring."49
Similar examples exist for corporate parents who regularly
form corporate subsidiaries to avoid liability. In a recent federal
appellate case, the Eighth Circuit held:
The doctrine of limited liability is intended precisely to protect a parent cor-
poration whose subsidiary goes broke. That is the whole purpose of the doc-
trine, and those who have the right to decide such questions, that is, legisla-
tures, believe that the doctrine, on the whole, is socially reasonable and use-
ful. We think that the doctrine would largely be destroyed if a parent corpo-
ration could be held liable simply on the basis of errors in business judg-
ment.5°
III. THE THEORETICAL BACKDROP FOR LIMITED AND UNLIMITED
LIABILITY
A. In Bargain, Tort, and Enterprise Liability Settings
Limited liability for corporate participants is generally ac-
cepted in a bargain setting. The introduction of a corporation into a
transaction necessarily shifts risks, as compared to the same trans-
action involving partners or other business participants not possessing
limited liability.5' By forming a corporation, shareholders ordinarily
limit their liability to the amount they have invested. If that amount
is insufficient to pay the obligations of the enterprise when they come
due, some of the risks of the business will be borne by others (for
example, trade creditors, employees, government, or tort victims).
The reasons for non-shareholders carrying some of the risks of the
enterprise are sufficiently strong that few question the shifting of
these risks when creditors voluntarily deal with the limited liability
enterprise. 52 In some situations, the non-shareholder may be a more
49. Id.
50. Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305,311 (8th Cir. 1992).
51. See Uniform Partnership Act § 15 (West, 1969) (specifying liability for partners).
52. The deference accorded such bargaining varies substantially among scholars writing
about limited liability. Compare Gabaldon, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 1430 n.252 (cited in note 3)
(cautioning against overreliance on the assumption of equal information and bargaining power to
justify the "ostensible willingness of third parties" to accept risk) and Roger E. Meiners, James S.
Mofsky, and Robert D. Tollison, Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 Del. J. Corp. L. 351, 366-
67 (1979) (noting that involuntary creditors inadvertently or intentionally decide which risks to
bear and which risks to cover with insurance; for example, a person may ride in an adequately in-
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efficient monitor of a particular risk. Consider, for example, an owner
who offers to sell a business to a buyer who is not confident that
future growth can support the seller's suggested price. If the parties
enter into a deferred payment contract, the seller may accept a newly
created corporation as the obligor for future payments instead of
lowering the price. The seller now assumes the risk of nonpayment
rather than the buyer, which would make sense if the seller's past
experience gives it more reliable information about future prospects.3
Alternatively, the creditors may possess a comparative advan-
tage in monitoring managers. This result is more likely to occur in
larger corporations, in which the shareholders are numerous,
dispersed, passive investors and whose lenders are banks or other
institutional investors with specific knowledge about a particular
industry.m4 In addition, the shareholders may be more risk averse
than creditors.5 From a structural standpoint, mandatory periodic
payments owed to creditors force a company to return to the credit
market for capital, subjecting the enterprise to the discipline of
recurring monitoring by outsiders.5 In any event, so long as the
parties can raise or lower prices or negotiate over additional security
(including a personal guaranty or a security interest in assets), there
is little need for the law to override the parties' bargain by placing the
risks on one party or the other. Starting with limited liability saves
transaction costs in many situations as compared to having the
parties start from unlimited liability.57
sured cab and pay the extra insurance cost in the form of a higher fare or ride in an uninsured cab
and pay a lower fare).
53. An example is RKO-Stanley Warner Theatres, Inc. v. Graziano, 467 Pa. 220, 355 A.2d
830 (1976), in which the seller retaining a security interest in a theater expressly agreed to the
formation of a corporation to replace the individual purchasers. In a decision based on the
defective incorporation doctrine, the court hold the individuals personally liable when the
corporation was later formed but failed to close on the agreement. The seller, as a corporation
experienced in the movie business, likely received a higher price since it was taking the risk of fu-
ture nonperformance, but ended up with both the higher price and the individuals' personal
liability.
54. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law 46 (Harvard U., 1991) (stating that banks or institutional investors may be good monitors of
certain decisions such as whether to build a new plant, even though they are not residual
claimants); Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev.
499, 501-03 (1976) (indicating a bank as an example of a better risk appraiser than a shareholder
of a public corporation).
55. For example, the creditor may be diversified and the shareholder not. See Posner, 43 U.
Chi. L. Rev. at 502 n.8.
56. See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 46 (cited in
note 54).
57. See Sykes, 93 Yale L. J. at 1245 (cited in note 2) (stating that '[i]f transaction costs
prevent efficient shifting of risk to the principal, then the principal must compensate the agent
more generously than he would in an ideal world'). See also Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation
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However, this consensus disappears when the context changes
to tort. Limited liability in a tort setting raises the possibility that an
enterprise will not bear all of its costs. Entrepreneurs contemplating
the tort consequences of a limited liability business need not concern
themselves with harm to others that would generate liabilities beyond
the amount contributed to the enterprise.8 Permitting an enterprise
to avoid the full costs of its activities creates incentives for excessive
risk-taking. For example, the enterprise may not sufficiently invest in
safety or may overinvest in hazardous activities. 5 Given the direct
liability for personal participation in tortious acts as discussed above,
the real focus of dispute is the extent to which vicarious liability
should be imposed for the acts of others in a corporation.
Imposing liability on participants for the tortious acts of others
usually reflects one of two basic motivations: to provide a stimulus to
the appropriate party to avoid the harm or to allocate the risk to the
most efficient risk-bearer. The first factor, aimed at deterrence, will
clearly have a greater effect in corporate settings if directed to officer
liability or in close corporations where there is an overlap of the
management and investment functions. Hansmann and Kraakman
believe shareholder liability can play a similar role even in public
corporations in which shareholders do not perform the management
function. This indirect effect can occur to the extent that the share
price would incorporate the possibility of additional shareholder
liability. Management could be expected to respond to this signal as it
might to any other cost that affects share price.60 In addition,
shareholders facing additional liability might be expected to seek more
information about liabilities or the firm's insurance. Some of this
information might come from sources outside the firm, providing
of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70 Wash. U. L. Q. 417, 448 (1992) (arguing that
"limited liability eliminates costs rather than simply transferring them to victims").
58. See Sykes, 93 Yale L. J. at 1241-42 (cited in note 2) (noting that liability limited to a
potentially insolvent agent 'increases the expected profits of the principal-agent enterprise by the
value of the judgment less the agent's ability to pay, multiplied by the probability of the judg-
ment").
Leebron illustrates this point by reference to the standard learning of financial economics that
investors base value on risk and return, with risk being defined as the dispersion of all possible
outcomes from the mean. Computing return requires determining all possible future outcomes of
the investment and their probability. Leebron's example includes a 1% chance that the shares
will be completely worthless (the other 99% are dispersed among various options up to a profit of
more than $100). In an unlimited liability regime, that bottom 1% probability would be a negative
number, if the investor would be required to pay additional funds. Under limited liability, that
number cannot be negative, but only $0. Since value is a weighted average of all future returns,
the value of an investment in a limited liability enterprise will be higher. See Leebron, 91 Colum.
L. Rev. at 1570-72 (cited in note 17).
59. See Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1882-83 (cited in note 3).
60. See id. at 1907. See also id. at 1903 (stating that 'the purpose of unlimited liability is to
make share prices reflect tort costs") (emphasis in original).
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additional information that otherwise might not have been part of
management's decisions.61
The risk-distribution aspect of the argument would have the
greatest impact when many shareholders hold diversified portfolios as
compared to tort claimants who face large losses of health, life, or
property. There are circumstances, however, in which shareholders
would be comparatively inefficient risk-bearers. For example, if only a
few shareholders exist or a joint and several unlimited liability rule is
applied, and if the injuries to particular tort victims are generally not
severe, the distributive justification for shareholder liability
disappears.6 2
The recent flurry of proposals to extend liability beyond the
enterprise builds on the now-mature legal doctrine making the enter-
prise liable for acts of those within the firm without applying strict
causation or agency principles found in earlier law.63 The extension of
liability beyond the enterprise rests on similar efforts to make the
enterprise internalize costs and to spread costs to better risk-bearers.64
However, the earlier enterprise liability scholarship tended to assume
shareholders' limited liability5 and therefore included little discussion
of how the enterprise liability principles might apply to shareholder
liability. One factor frequently cited to support enterprise liability is
the transfer of risks to third parties that would otherwise occur when
an agent lacks sufficient assets to satisfy a claim,66 a concern that also
fits a corporate-shareholder relationship in which the insufficient
assets of the corporation can lead to incomplete internalization and
too little care. However, other reasons for enterprise liability do not
work as well. For example, enterprise liability can be justified as a
response to the difficulty in determining the particular person in the
61. Id. at 1907.
62. Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1603 (cited in note 17) (noting that if insurance is
available for tort victims, it is not clear that shareholders are better risk-bearers; if there are only
a few shareholders and the tort injuries are not severe, if victim insurance is available but
shareholder liability insurance is unavailable, or if diversification exists, shareholders will not be
better risk-bearers).
63. See generally Kornhauser, 70 Cal. L. Rev. at 1345 (cited in note 2); Sykes, 93 Yale L. J.
at 1231 (cited in note 2).
64. Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1919 (cited in note 3) (stating that 'if tort
law is to have any role in shifting risks to low-cost insurers, then using it to shift risks to the
equity market makes sense').
65. Compare Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 Yale L. J. 857, 862 (1984) (setting aside the most basic issue of all-the ultimate
wisdom of limited shareholder liability.) Professor Kraakman returned to the issue at length.
See note 3.
66. See Kornhauser, 70 Cal. L. Rev. at 1362 (cited in note 2); Sykes, 93 Yale L. J. at 1241-42
(cited in note 2).
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organization responsible for wrongful actions.6 7  Enterprise liability
removes an inducement to scapegoat a particular individual for deci-
sions made elsewhere in the organization.6 8 The enterprise likely will
be better able than a court to sort out joint responsibility. As liability
extends beyond the enterprise to shareholders, however, these argu-
ments shrink, and the costs of enforcing such a system increase.6 9
Just as enterprise liability theory did not engage the liability of
shareholders, traditional discussions of limited liability seldom ad-
dressed tort contexts. The story most often told for limited liability in
corporations emphasizes its importance in facilitating large aggrega-
tions of funds to fuel the growth of industrial America. 70  Limited
liability reassured investors otherwise unwilling to invest in activities
beneficial to society71 and facilitated the growth of a widespread public
67. Christopher D. Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate
Conduct, 90 Yale L. J. 1 (1980).
68. Kathleen F. Brickey, Close Corporations and the Criminal Law: On "Mom and Pop"
and a Curious Rule, 71 Wash. U. L. Q. 189, 194 (1993) (citing individual misconduct as a response
to subtle or overt institutional pressures and arguing that singling out low-level employees could
well be regarded as choosing a convenient scapegoat).
69. See Sykes, 93 Yale L. J. at 1271 (cited in note 2) (noting that litigation costs in some
situations may suffice to render vicarious liability inefficient).
These arguments help explain why imposing extended liability on shareholders is different
from the loss shareholders suffer when their corporation pays tort damages. Thus, providing
limited liability for shareholders does not necessarily lead to a finding that no corporate liability
for torts should be imposed. But see Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1908 (cited in
note 3). Imposing liability on the corporation does not create the diversification problem that
shareholder liability might entail. Compare Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1578 (cited in note 17)
(arguing that vicarious unlimited liability is not fundamentally different from vicarious limited
liability) and 1612 n.143 (asking why, if limited liability currently penalizes individual
shareholders for the benefit of tort victims up to the amount of the shareholders' investment,
should the penalty be so limited? Possible reasons include the claim that excess liability is
inefficient and the presence of comparative risk-taking.).
70. Professor James Willard Hurst qualifies the traditional story, concluding that other
opportunities for "limited commitment investment provided by the corporate form (for example,
the ability to invest in an enterprise with a defined purpose, defined shares, or one with assur-
ance of limited drafts upon investor time and energy) were as important to the growth of
corporations as limited liability. James Willard Hurst, The Legitimacy of the Business Corpora-
tion in the Law of the United States 1780-1970 28 (U. Press. of Va., 1970).
71. See Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 643,
654 (1932) (stating, [lit was found in medieval Europe that men would often decline to adventure
in business transactions unless they could so limit their liability. And this was especially the case
when those who were asked to join the enterprise had no direct control over its management.");
William P. Hackney and Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 837, 840 (1982). See generally Phillip I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups:
Substantive Law (Little, Brown, 1987).
Limited liability existed both in the United States and elsewhere prior to its becoming a
typical feature of corporations. See, for example, the in rem liability of the ship in maritime law.
More recently, Stephen Presser has demonstrated that the introduction of limited liability in the
United States in the first half of the 19th century reflected in part a desire to encourage in-
vestment in the small firm or investment by entrepreneurs of modest means. Stephen B. Presser,
Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 148, 163 (1992). See also Stephen B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil § 1.03[1]
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market for shares. 72 Concern about shifting liability to tort victims did
not play a large role in the discussion of limited liability. Piercing the
corporate veil, the principal legal vehicle used to restrict limited
liability, has been described as concerned primarily with fraudulent
conveyance law, 73 and the great majority of piercing cases arise in a
bargain setting.74
B. Economics-Based Arguments to Extend Liability
In response to recent calls to eliminate limited liability, debate
has moved from the traditional historical justification to two issues
informed by economic theory. Each of these issues in turn raises
questions regarding insurance as a possible explanation or solution.
1. The Finance Dimension: Will Unlimited Liability Adversely Affect
Markets or the Firm's Capital Structure and Shareholder
Diversification?
A dominant argument for extending liability to shareholders
rests on the superior risk-bearing ability of dispersed shareholders of
public corporations. A primary attraction of a developed securities
market derives from its ability to permit individual shareholders to
diversify cheaply against firm-specific risks. By holding a portfolio of
stocks that do not move in direct relation to one another, an investor
can anticipate that gains from one part of the portfolio will balance
out losses from another part. Under limited liability, the possibility of
one firm in the portfolio failing will not affect the other stocks held in
the portfolio beyond the investor's initial investment.
Under an unlimited liability regime, one severe liability claim
could wipe out the entire portfolio. Indeed, the more stocks that are in
the portfolio, the greater the possibility of a catastrophic claim wiping
(Clark Boardman Callaghan, 1991). Limited liability thus is tied to the desire to encourage
investment by more than the wealthiest members of society, and perhaps even to the goal of
dispersing wealth in order to preserve a republican form of government. Id. at 155, 163.
72. See Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 Va. L.
Rev. 259, 262 (1967) (noting that limited liability likely is an essential aspect of a corporate system
with widespread public participation); Susan E. Woodward, Limited Liability in the Theory of the
Firm, 141 J. Institutional & Theoretical Economics 601, 604-05 (1985); William 0. Douglas and
Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L. J. 193
(1929) (observing that the corporate device has lent itself particularly well to the public marketing
of securities).
73. Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 Harv. L.
Rev. 505, 542 n.98 (1977) (noting that the most frequent problems in the piercing area are
fraudulent transfer and similar contract-related claims).
74. Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1071 (cited in note 15) (concluding that piercing the
corporate veil usually occurs in a bargain setting).
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out the entire portfolio. Hansmann and Kraakman suggest that di-
versification is possible so long as liability is pro rata, rather than
joint and several.75 Professor David Leebron would not go as far,
advising that diversification would be practical only by investing in a
portfolio that does not contain equity securities.7 6
Unlimited liability also can affect the market indirectly to the
extent that it impacts on the amount of monitoring. Under joint and
several unlimited liability, a shareholder's ultimate exposure may
turn on whether she is the richest or poorest investor and how likely
she is to be the target of plaintiffs; shareholders may seek to monitor
each other's wealth both at the time of purchase and as the identity
and wealth of the other shareholders change. 7  Nor would this moni-
toring function be spread equally; only larger, richer shareholders
might undertake it. Such disparity would mean that the stock would
have a different value for each shareholder, breaking down the liquid-
ity of the public markets that has been one of the primary advantages
of modern public corporations as an investment vehicle.
Proportionate liability instead of joint and several liability may
respond to this problem."8 While this variation may be necessary to
preserve a public market and to reduce unnecessary monitoring, it
undercuts the compensatory effect of the liability rule. When com-
bined with the transaction costs described below, even a proportionate
liability rule may have the deleterious effect of leading to the decline
of mutual funds. Such funds would remain as an inviting target of
opportunity to any plaintiff and thus may have rates of return less
than those available through direct individual investments.
75. If the liability were joint and several, any one investor could be sued for the corpora-
tion's entire debt; it is likely, however, that different investors would face different risks of being
sued because of their wealth or easy amenability to suit. In contrast, if the liability were pro rata,
each investor would be liable only for the proportion of the claim corresponding to the share-
holder's ownership interest in the business. See Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at
1892-93 (cited in note 3).
76. See Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1600 (cited in note 17) (stating that "unlimited
liability in either of its forms might significantly deter from equity investments those investors
seeking to diversify their investments which would include most passive and fiduciary investors').
77. See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 45 (cited in
note 54).
78. See Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 627 (cited in note 34); Hansmann and Kraakman, 100
Yale L. J. at 1892-94 (cited in note 3); Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1578-84 (cited in note 17).
But see Joseph A. Grundfest, The Limited Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets
Perspective, 102 Yale L. J. 387, 411-12 (1992) (contending that liquid, actively traded equity means
proportionate liability cannot work; if, as Hansmann and Kraakman suggest, the 'constructive
equity' doctrine is used to respond to potential increases in the use of derivative securities to
avoid unlimited liability, the potential exposure of any one investor will turn on the size of the
open interest in derivative securities, which is unknown; this situation recreates externalities to
which limited liability responds, because liability turns on the behavior of other investors).
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The connection between limited liability and public markets
has been widely accepted, but there is very little concrete evidence
concerning public markets without limited liability. Professor Phillip
Blumberg cites the widespread trading of joint stock associations with
many dispersed shareholders in England in the eighteenth century.79
Professors Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have described the
continuation of double liability for bank shareholders into the middle
of the twentieth century; at least some of those banks seemed to have
large numbers of shareholders 0  As Professor Peter Grossman has
described, American Express continued as a joint stock association
with unlimited liability until 1965.1, There appeared to be a liquid
market for its shares even in the face of a financial debacle that raised
the possibility of shareholder liability.82 Indeed, Professor Joseph
Grundfest has suggested something of a contrary argument, focusing
not so much on the essentialness of limited liability to markets but
arguing that markets will find ways to provide limited liability even if
the legal rule seeks to decree otherwise.3
2. The Liability Dimension: What Effect Would Unlimited Liability
Have on Incentives to Control Harm and the Amount Available for
Recovery?
The initial focus of tort law when applied to limited liability is
that corporations with limited liability will underinvest in safety and
overinvest in hazardous activities.84 Yet the reverse is also possible
when liability is imposed on managers or shareholders. Shareholders
in close corporations or managers in public corporations who have
firm-specific human capital invested in the corporation may cause the
corporation to overinvest in safety for fear of losing their own invest-
ment. This tendency is exacerbated if the managers do not have an
79. See Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 581-82 (cited in note 34).
80. Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, Double Liability of Bank Shareholders:
History and Implications, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31, 50-51 (1992) (describing the Carnegie Trust
failure, which involved a suit against 225 shareholders; 19th century cases mainly involved a
single shareholder, while cases in the early 20th century involved a larger number of sharehold-
ers).
81. Peter Grossman, American Express: The Unofficial History of the People Who Built the
Great Financial Empire 329 (Crown, 1987).
82. In 1963 the 'salad oil scandal" left an American Express subsidiary potentially liable for
$150 million of claims. See id. at 319. Professor Grossman reports the company's net worth to be
about $70 million. (Interview with Peter Grossman, Oct. 8, 1993). The price of American Express
stock dropped by half, but a market continued in the stock. See generally Peter Grossman, The
Market for Shares of Companies with Unlimited Liability: The Case of American Express (Wash.
U. Bus., Law & Econ. Center Working Paper 1994) (on file with the Author).
83. See Grundfest, 102 Yale L. J. at 389-90 (cited in note 78).
84. See Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1882-83 (cited in note 3).
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ownership interest in the enterprise and thus do not share in any
upside potential of a choice not to overinvest in safety. 5 In addition,
unlimited liability might lead to an excessive amount of monitoring,
as both creditors and shareholders duplicate monitoring.8
A rule other than limited liability imposes additional
transaction costs that would affect both the distributive and
deterrence goals of tort law. If additional liability causes a change in
a firm's investment structure, both risk-bearing and control incentives
will be affected. First, there would be substantial costs in making
assessments on many dispersed shareholders. There is some limited
historical information as to the feasibility of a collection system. Both
the creditors' bill in the nineteenth century 7 and collections under
bank double liability laws in the twentieth century88 offer evidence of
collection from a large group of shareholders (although not the size of
today's publicly held corporations). Yet as Leebron recognizes, the
costs would consume the benefit of collecting from many small
shareholdings so that enforcement is likely only to be feasible for
entities such as parent-subsidiary groups.89
A second transaction cost is the increase in evasion strategies,
such as the transfer of assets to judgment-proof investors or managers
who then carry out risky activities. Grundfest has described how the
development of new derivative securities would permit investors in
capital markets to adjust to unlimited liability and still preserve their
own limited liability.90 Professor Janet Cooper Alexander's extensive
treatment of the jurisdictional difficulties of an extended liability rule
exposes the complexity of new issues that will arise as the liability
discussion shifts91 Without discussing all possible details of evasion,
it seems fair to say that an unlimited liability regime would still
permit a significant degree of evasion.
85. See id. at 1929 (recognizing that managers facing excess liability risks will overinvest in
loss prevention, resign, or become judgment-proof); Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1612 n.143
(cited in note 17) (arguing for the limitation of excess liability if the imposition of excess liability
would be ineffective).
86. See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 45 (cited in
note 54).
87. See Blumberg, 11 J. Corp. L. at 603 (cited in note 34).
88. See Macey and Miller, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31 (cited in note 80).
89. Leebron, 91 Colunm. L. Rev. at 1612 (cited in note 17) (claiming that enforcement costs
blunt pro rata as the optimal rule).
90. Grundfest, 102 Yale L. J. at 387 (cited in note 78).
91. Alexander, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 387 (cited in note 3).
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3. The Insurance Dimension
Discussion of expanded liability necessarily involves insurance
as a possible substitute. If the focus is on protection for the tort vic-
tim, unlimited liability and mandatory insurance can be seen as alter-
native solutions. One can view unlimited liability as a method by
which shareholders provide insurance to tort victims of the enterprise.
Under this view, one would compare the alternative price of insurance
versus the reduction in the price the shareholders would pay for the
shares reflecting the fact that the shareholders are, in effect, issuing
insurance.
As to the finance dimension, insurance has been offered to
counter adverse effects on markets. Judge Frank Easterbrook and
Professor Daniel Fischel have noted that limited liability was more
important to the growth of publicly held corporations in the nine-
teenth century because insurance markets were less developed than
the markets today.92 Thus, current shareholder concerns about addi-
tional liability may dissipate to the extent that insurance is easily and
cheaply available to them. Hansmann and Kraakman's proposal rests
on an expanded role for insurance. They envision portfolio insurance
sold to individual investors by insurers or brokerage houses just as life
insurance currently is sold to airline passengers. In addition, they see
the development of more esoteric forms of insurance, such as retro-
active insurance, to permit continued trading of the stock of a firm
that has suffered a tort-producing accident with damages not yet
specified.
Insurance may seem like an attractive method to provide pro-
tection to tort victims without changing shareholder investment pat-
terns, but such a status quo result seems unlikely. Even if an airline-
type distribution system is available, loading costs will be high.9 3
Insurance will not work to the extent that policy exclusions are imper-
fectly enforced. For example, in the environmental area, there has
been extensive litigation as to the extent that insurance policy provi-
sions exclude environmental claims. If courts broadly interpret poli-
cies after the fact to include ambiguous claims, such imperfect en-
forcement would require insurers to price this moral hazard, and the
92. Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 48 (cited in note
54).
93. Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1901 (cited in note 3), recognize that
"loading costs on portfolio insurance, were it available, would be high,* and they assume that
large and diversified shareholders would avoid it. Elsewhere they note that loading costs
constituted 27% of annual premiums paid in 1984. Id. at 1889 (citing Louis De Alessi, Why
Corporations Insure, 25 Econ. Inquiry 429, 432 (1987)).
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size of the premium required would lead most prospective insurance
purchasers to self-insure.
In addition, portfolio insurance would insure not only against
particular hazards; it also necessarily would insure against the risk of
bankruptcy of the particular firm and to some extent the general
business cycle. Such coverage also raises a moral hazard problem and
might embolden management to take excessive risks,94 affecting ad-
versely the incentive of other investors to monitor managers.
Such risks are likely to affect adversely the availability of in-
surance. Some evidence exists that insurance is unavailable against
environmental liabilities when extended liability has been applied in a
way parallel to proposals for shareholder liability.95 In addition, large
environmental claims imposed against investors in Lloyd's of London
have rocked that venerable institution and illustrate an inhibition to
the formation of large insurance groups that could follow from unlim-
ited liability. 6 More generally, George Priest has argued that tort law
curently extends well beyond what is necessary to provide sufficient
insurance and that insurance features should be eliminated from
modern tort law. 97
Although the primary direction of this Part seeks to analyze
how economic principles explain liability rules, these principles un-
doubtedly do not capture fully all reasons for the continuation of
94. See Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 48-49 (cited
in note 54).
95. Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance, 88 Colum.
L. Rev. 942, 944 (1988) (observing, "In the past two years, for example, not only has the cost of the
little environmental liability insurance that is still available skyrocketed; more importantly, for
most businesses in the United States insurance against environmental liability is completely
unavailable."). See also Geoffirey M. Dugan, Liabilities of Corporate Individuals for Environ-
mental Claims Under CERCLA The Current State of the Law and Strategies for Coping, 23
Envir. L. Rptr. 10074, 10079 (1993) (noting that '[u]ntil recently, commercial insurance markets
could not be viewed as an effective means of reducing risks of environmental problems ....
Recently, however, insurance companies have introduced various new products that, although
largely untested, may offer some relief to businesses.").
96. See Grundfest, 102 Yale L. J. at 420 (cited in note 78) (observing that "Lloyd's of
London, long the paradigmatic example of an institution that relied on unlimited liability, has
recently announced plans to limit the liability" of its individual participants). One could expect to
see shareholders withdraw in the face of extended liability in the same way that directors resign
as liability increases.
97. See George L. Priest, Satisfying the Multiple Goals of Tort Law, 22 Valp. U. L. Rev. 643,
645 (1988) (stating that "[tort law, in fact, is a disastrous method of providing insurance for
unpreventable losses[,] ... provides benefit in wrong amounts .... diminishes the extent of bank
insurance coverage" (and at higher administrative costs than first-party insurance)). See also
George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 Yale L. J. 1521, 1525
(1987) (noting, "The expansion of liability since the mid-1960s has been chiefly motivated by the
concern of our courts to provide insurance to victims who have suffered personal injury.... This
insurance rationale suffuces our modern civil law and must be acknowledged as one of the great
humanitarian expressions of our time. The paradox exposed by my theory is that the expansion of
tort liability has had exactly the opposite effect.").
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limited liability. It may be that these economic models fail to capture
fully the entire benefit of limited liability diffused over the entire
society that benefits from an increased amount of economic activity.
To that extent the continued judicial preference for limited liability in
corporate groups, discussed later in this Article, may reflect a society-
wide judgment that the benefits of limited liability exceed its costs. It
may be that the continued preference for limited liability, for example,
by courts refusing to pierce the veil, is a judicial counterweight to
broad extensions of liability, as in products liability cases.9 8 The justi-
fication that limited liability should be preserved as a check on run-
away tort damages may have some attraction to those desirous of tort
reforms, recently a popular political topic.99 Nevertheless, Hansmann
and Kraakman are correct in their characterization of limited liability
as an extremely crude check on such expansive liability if it exists.10°
While probing deeper for the appropriate responses to this tort
damage issue, one should not underestimate the collective weight of
individual judicial decisions addressing limited liability. The legal
doctrine of piercing the veil is so amorphous that it leaves a large area
in which courts can impose liability based upon a "smell" test of
fairness. One of the most startling results of the empirical study of
1600 piercing-the-veil cases was that courts pierce less often in tort
than in contract cases, 10' even though economic analysis suggests the
opposite result. Most of the tort cases arose within corporate groups
in which tort concerns of ability to control and diversification would
make limited liability less preferred. Yet the percentage of courts
piercing the veil in tort cases within corporate groups (26.32 percent)
is even less than in all tort cases (30.97 percent) or all cases involving
corporate groups (37.21 percent).'0 2  It may be too broad a
characterization to see these results as a response to the tort liability
98. See generally W. Kip Viscusi, The Dimensions of the Product Liability Crisis, 20 J.
Legal Stud. 147 (1991) (indicating doctrinal changes as leading to products liability). Compare
James Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products Liability: An
Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.LA. L. Rev. 479 (1990) (noting that courts since the
mid.1980s have not been expanding liability as they did prior to that time).
99. See Ribstein, 70 Wash. U. L. Q. at 447 (cited in note 57) (claiming that an inefficient tort
system may provide a remedy that "would exceed appropriate loss prevention and loss
distribution').
100. Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1918 (cited in note 3) (arguing that firms
should not be invited "to opt out of the tort system by exploiting limited liability*).
101. Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1058, 1068 (cited in note 15). Courts pierced the veil in
30.97% of cases arising in tort settings (70 of 226) and in 41.98% of cases arising in contract
settings (327 of 779). Id. at 1058.
102. Of the 226 tort cases, 152 included corporate groups. Within this subset, courts pierced
in only 40 (26.32%) of the cases. The other results are from Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1055,
1058 (cited in note 15).
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explosion, but these results should provoke a more systematic analysis
of why courts continue to see the virtue of limited liability in these
cases.
IV. VICARIous LIABILITY IN THE NEW REGULATORY STATE
Recent regulatory laws, such as those in the environmental
and pensions areas, illustrate the need to unpack the bases for vicari-
ous liability at the intersection of corporate law and tort law. Federal
environmental statutes such as CERCLA1°  evidence a desire to help
clean the environment by making a number of participants responsi-
ble for pollution sites, including present and past owners, operators,
and transporters. 1°4 The law does not specify whether the corporate
veil may be pierced when defining who is an owner or operator. Some
have argued that managers or shareholders generally are liable under
CERCLA only when they could have been liable under traditional
corporate law doctrine.10 5 Others assert that the statutory purpose
evidences a federal policy to override the limited liability rules of state
law and to hold managers or shareholders liable for the acts of their
corporation. 06 This issue is a variation of the perceived conflict
between corporate law and tort law that began this Article.
Similarly, in recent years, many suits have raised the issue of
whether plaintiffs may recover from officers or shareholders for a
corporation's failure to make contributions to employee pension funds
as required by law or contract. A federal purpose derived from the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to protect em-
ployee pensions parallels the purpose found in the environmental laws
to prevent companies from escaping their clean-up obligations. °7
103. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1991). See Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1928 (cited in note 3)
(suggesting that CERCLA liability for customers, lenders, corporate parents, and other affiliated
actors serves as a 'diluted form of de facto unlimited liability" and that judicial application uses
principles similar to those advocated by the authors).
104. CERCLA may do more than require internalization of costs. See, for example, Dent, 26
Wake Forest L. Rev. at 171 (cited in note 42) (noting that risk-spreading goes beyond inducing
cautious behavior; government may be a better risk-spreader than the largest firm).
105. See generally Lynda J. Oswald and Cindy A. Schipani, CERCLA and the "Erosion" of
Traditional Corporate Law Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. 259 (1992).
106. See Kathryn R. Heidt, Liability of Shareholders Under the Comprehensive Environ.
mental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 52 Ohio St. L. J. 133 (1991)
(observing that a federal rule specific to CERCLA is developing, which focuses on "pervasive
control").
107. See Connors v. Incoal, Inc., 1993 WL 186019 (D.C. Cir. June 4, 1993) (holding a farm
partnership of the family members who owned a coal mining corporation liable for the
corporation's liability after withdrawal from a multi-employer pension plan; no economic nexus
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This Part separately considers these liability questions from
the standpoint of holding either managers or shareholders liable,
assuming that those named parties perform the functions usually
assigned to them by corporate doctrine. If a defendant fits into only
one group, there are reasons to limit the extent of liability, as dis-
cussed in the prior Part. Although the language of recent cases sug-
gests broad liability for each group, courts usually impose liability in
most cases only when there is direct participation by the defendant or,
for vicarious liability, if there is an overlap of the management and
shareholder functions.
A. Liability of Managers
Recent statutes and judicial decisions have extended direct
liability further in the direction of vicarious liability by imposing on
managers a duty to supervise or monitor. Examples of such liability
can be found in a torts context where an officer with a duty to super-
vise has been held liable for a corporation's copyright infringement
even though the officer was without direct knowledge,1°8 in criminal
law where an individual officer has been found liable for a
corporation's safety violation,1°9 and in tax law where officers are held
liable for a corporation's failure to forward to the government tax
funds withheld from employees' paychecks.1 °  These results
demonstrate some parallel to the responsible corporate officer doctrine
in criminal law under which a corporate agent vested with
responsibility to devise compliance measures can be convicted upon
the corporation's failure to comply with a statute."'
Such a duty to supervise or monitor already exists in corporate
law, but as part of a director's duty to shareholders, not as part of a
between the entities was required for liability under 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b) (1) (1988)). See generally
the cases in notes 125 and 126.
108. See, for example, Feder v. Videotrip Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1165 (D. Colo. 1988).
109. See, for example, People ex. rel. Volberg v. Durch, 140 Misc. 2d 353, 530 N.Y.S.2d 956
(1988) (holding the corporation's president criminally liable for violations of safety regulations and
procedures applicable to elevators in commercial premises).
110. See 26 U.S.C. § 6672 (1988 & Supp. 1992). See also, for example, Bowen v. United
States, 836 F.2d 965 (Sth Cir. 1988) (finding the failure of the corporation's president and vice-
president to remit taxes withheld from employees' pay willful and subjecting the president and
vice-president to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax). In contrast to the federal statute
that imposes liability on officers, statutes in New York and Wisconsin impose liability on the
largest shareholders for the corporation's failure to pay wage claims. See N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §
630 (McKinney 1986); Wisc. Stat. § 180.40(6) (1992).
111. See, for example, United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). See also United States v.
Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984) (recognizing that an employee could be held
liable for knowing endangerment if he took affirmative steps to shield himself from actual
knowledge).
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director's or officer's duty to creditors or "outsiders." In Graham v.
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co.,112 the plaintiff filed a derivative
suit seeking to recover from directors for their failure to take action
designed to learn of and prevent antitrust violations by corporate
employees. The court denied liability based on the size of the
enterprise-a large, publicly held corporation with 30,000 employees
spread over a large geographic area. The court permitted the board
members to confine themselves to large policy decisions absent
cavalier performance or inattention to obvious danger signs of
employee wrongdoing. The court held that the directors had no duty
"to install and operate a corporate system.., to ferret out wrongdoing
which they have no reason to suspect exists."1'3
Subsequent statements of corporate duty suggest a somewhat
broader, less passive duty. The Corporate Director's Guidebook states
that "[t]he corporate director should be concerned that the corporation
has programs looking toward compliance with applicable laws and
regulations, both foreign and domestic, that it circulates (as appropri-
ate) policy statements to this effect to its employees, and that it main-
tains procedures for monitoring such compliance."11 4 The official com-
ment to the American Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Govern-
ance section on a director's duty of care states that "an ordinarily
prudent person serving as the director of a corporation of any signifi-
cant scale or complexity should recognize the need to be reasonably
concerned with the existence and effectiveness of procedures, pro-
grams and other techniques to assist the board in its oversight role."1,
The Corporate Director's Guidebook was intended to provide
corporate practice recommendations rather than rules of law; the ALI
project explicitly emphasizes that its duty of care standard is "not
intended to create new third party rights (e.g. for tort claimants or
government agencies) against directors or officers. The standards...
apply only to relationships among directors, officers, shareholders, and
their corporations." 16 Despite such apparent limitations, existing law
permits these current standards to be used for the benefit of those
outside the group of directors, officers, and shareholders. In Francis v.
112. 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1963).
113. Id. at 130-31.
114. American Bar Association, Section of Corporation, Banking, and Business Law,
Committee on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. Law. 1591, 1610 (1978).
See also The Business Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the
Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. Law. 2083, 2101 (1978) (listing compliance with law
as a "core function" of the board).
115. See American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Rec-
ommendations § 4.01(a) (1)-(a) (2), cmt. c at 217 (Proposed Final Draft 1992).
116. Id. § 4.01, cmt. fat 187.
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United Jersey Bank,117 in which an action was brought by the trustee
in bankruptcy of a reinsurance broker, the court found a breach of a
director's fiduciary duty to the corporation by a director who had
inherited forty-eight percent of the corporation's stock from her hus-
band, the founder of the business. The widow was held liable for the
diversion of $10,000,000 from the corporation by her two sons who
served as the other two directors and actively controlled the company's
business.
Recent case law and statutes suggest a stronger duty to moni-
tor, at least in tort or regulatory contexts, when the party to be pro-
tected is the government, consumers, or tort victims. 1 8 For example,
liability imposed because the defendant could have prevented or
significantly abated the disposal of hazardous waste blurs the distinc-
tion with vicarious liability.119 One should not, however, overestimate
the reach of these cases in applying vicarious liability. The language
of the opinion in Francis suggests that liability was based on director
status, but the actual liability fell on the estate of the director who
had a strong economic investment in the business. Many of the new
regulatory cases appear to impose broad liability on "operators" as
under some environmental laws, but the cases seem to require either
direct involvement or an overlap of economic gain and the ability to
control the actions of the wrongdoer. Courts should be careful to
separate vicarious liability placed on officers alone from either liability
imposed on officers for their direct participation or liability imposed on
a control person who also reaps the economic benefits of the
enterprise. When there is an overlap of management and
shareholding, there exists the greatest chance that decisions are being
made to externalize costs. When an extended duty to monitor is tied
to officers who have the ability to control but who may not be efficient
risk-bearers, overdeterrence may result. Analyzing the extent to
which these recent applications of duty to monitor extend liability
requires unpacking the arguments. A particular focus should be
whether the liability is direct or vicarious and whether it is based on
control or risk-sharing.
For example, liability is often imposed on individuals who
participate directly in waste disposal.120 As discussed in Part II above,
117. 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981).
118. See notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
119. See Dent, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 161 (cited in note 42).
120. See Heidt, 52 Ohio St. L. J. at 144-45 (cited in note 106) (noting that "[o]f the twenty or
more reported cases concerning shareholder liability for CERCLA claims, only five have
considered the question of veil piercing"; veil piercing often is unnecessary for liability in
CERCLA because facts often support direct liability).
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there is no conflict between tort and corporate principles in this con-
text; performing those wrongful acts in the guise of a corporate office
does not insulate a person from liability.121 What some see as a new
law unique to CERCLA is simply a recognition that an individual who
acts for a corporation in ways that violate regulatory rules is not
cloaked in corporateness.12 Yet some of the CERCLA cases do evi-
dence an expanded duty to monitor;' 23 to that extent, the CERCLA
limited liability cases do not mirror the historical pattern of piercing
cases. The CERCLA cases fit within the theory discussed here to the
extent that they are based on seeking to control an officer's conduct
without leading to overdeterrence. Alternatively, expanded liability
may be appropriate for an individual who both controls the enterprise
and reaps economic gains.
Certain pension cases seeking to hold individuals liable appear
to reflect this emphasis on direct participation. Courts have found
individuals liable when, for example, the president conspired to de-
fraud a benefits fund24 or was personally responsible for the decision
not to make the required contributions, 25 but generally have not held
shareholders liable in the absence of traditional piercing characteris-
121. See, for example, United States (EPA) v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F.
Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that a corporate officer
would be held liable as operator of a hazardous waste disposal site under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act given the officer's involvement in the site's operation and
finances). See also United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding a
parent corporation liable for a subsidiary's waste site when it actively participated in the
subsidiary's management while asbestos was being disposed of at the site); United States v.
Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988) (holding the sole owner of a corporation liable under
traditional piercing factors when the corporation was the alter ego of a prior sole proprietorship
that operated a hazardous waste facility).
122. See generally Oswald and Schipani, 86 Nw. U. L. Rev. at 259 (cited in note 105). See
also Cindy A. Schipani, Integrating Corporate Law Principles with CERCLA Liability for
Environmental Hazards, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 5 (1993) (stating that 'direct involvement in the ac-
tual environmental violations appears to be a significant prerequisite to the imposition of
individual liability').
123. Attorney General, Director of Dep't of Natural Resources v. Acme Disposal Co., 189
Mich. App. 722, 473 N.W.2d 824 (1991) (holding a shareholder in a position of authority personally
liable for a nuisance created or maintained by the corporation when he should have known,
through the exercise of ordinary diligence, of the corporation's tertious activities). See also Kelly
v. Thomas Solvent Co., 725 F. Supp. 1446 (W.D. Mich. 1988) (recognizing that liability can be
imposed on an owner-operator in a close corporation if that individual could have prevented or
significantly abated the hazardous waste discharge).
124. Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1989).
125. Serembus v. Comfort Lines, Inc., 689 F. Supp. 1496 (N.D. l. 1988). See also Dard-
aganis v. Grace Capital Inc., 889 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1989) (imposing personal liability on the
investment manager's chief executive officer for the company's fiduciary breach under ERISA in
exceeding the management agreement's equity limit, when the officer by his own admission
exercised discretion over how the plan's portfolio was invested); Lowen v. Tower Asset Manage.
ment, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 1542 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding an individual officer and shareholders of
the corporation liable for the corporation's breach of ERISA duties).
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tics. ' 2 A pension context may present a somewhat less compelling
case for piercing to the extent that many cases arise out of a collective
bargaining situation and there would have been some theoretical
chance to bargain for individual liability or that of the parent
corporation.
B. Liability of Shareholders
The most far-reaching of the recent proposals to reform limited
liability law would make all shareholders liable for torts of the enter-
prise. 27 The most significant departure from existing law would be
the increased liability imposed on passive shareholders. Under tradi-
tional piercing cases, the judicial focus has not been on passive
shareholders, but rather on active investors masquerading as passive
investors to gain the protection of limited liability. Piercing cases
reflect a judicial search to unmask efforts by participants who combine
both the ability to control and the opportunity for gain and use the
separate corporate form to the disadvantage of outsiders. Recent
commentary seeks to extend the legal concern beyond this group to
passive shareholders and remove what has, in effect, been a per se
rule against finding passive shareholders liable.12a
This argument for shareholder liability often is phrased in
terms of the benefit shareholders receive when their corporations
externalize costs.12 Benefit alone may support liability based on the
126. Plumbers' Pension Fund, Local 130 v. Niedrich, 891 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding
the president and secretary not liable); Rockney v. Blohorn, 877 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1989) (refusing
to hold an officer liable); Scarbrough v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding the sole
shareholder-chief executive officer of a parent corporation not liable for a subsidiary's unpaid
contributions); International Bhd. of Painters and Allied Trades Union v. George A Kracher, Inc.,
856 F.2d 1546 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (refusing to impose liability on the chief officer and principal
shareholder for delinquent pension contributions); DeBreceni v. GrafBros. Leasing, Inc., 828 F.2d
877 (1st Cir. 1987) (refusing to find the corporation's sole shareholder liable for the corporation's
ERISA withdrawal liability).
127. See, for example, Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1880 (cited in note 3)
(arguing that "there may be no persuasive reasons to prefer limited liability over a regime of
unlimited pro rata shareholder liability for corporate torts") (emphasis in original).
128. See id. at 1932. Their proposal would leave room for a court to find, in particular
circumstances, that costs should be imposed on the tort victim. Id. at 1917. They suggest that
courts should consider corporate structure in determining corporate liability and temper damages
to individual shareholders because of transaction costs of unlimited liability. Their advocacy of
judicial development of'constructive equity* rules to police investments that should be exposed to
extended liability would leave substantial room for continued judicial involvement similar to
current piercing cases. Their proposal is different, however, in that as a matter of principle,
liability of passive shareholders would not be foreclosed.
129. Id. (arguing that even those who benefit from residual equity ownership should be liable
for corporate acts); Alexander, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 396-97 (cited in note 3) (noting that economic
benefits derived by shareholders provide the principal argument in favor of shareholder liability).
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venerable law of unjust enrichment' 3° or may support a broader ar-
gument based on shareholders' personal responsibility.131 The reason-
ing of some CERCLA cases would seem to extend to passive share-
holders based on benefit. For example, in United States v. Monsanto
Co.,132 the Fourth Circuit permitted imposition of joint and several
liability without a showing of causation on defendants whose waste
disposal methods may have been technically legal prior to CERCLA's
enactment. The court noted that the defendants profited from
inexpensive disposal methods, citing an earlier Supreme Court
decision upholding retroactive liability for "Black Lung" benefits.13
The Supreme Court's language quoted in Monsanto upheld the Black
Lung law as "a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees'
disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor."13 4
Hansmann and Kraakman similarly view the shareholders' profit as
justifying their liability for corporate torts.135
The most developed arguments for expanded liability link
benefit with two traditional tort-based concerns: the efficiency of an
extended liability rule in changing the behavior of corporate managers
and the belief that shareholders are better risk-bearers than are tort
victims. Nevertheless, neither argument is consistent with the pre-
vailing law in the corporate area, nor are the arguments likely to
better serve tort purposes.
The effort to translate shareholder liability into increased
discipline over management activity reflects two distinctive strains of
130. See George Palmer, 1 The Law of Restitution § 1.7 at 41 (Little, Brown, 1978) (stating,
"There are times when a court gives relief on a finding no more precise than . . . that the
enrichment is unjust, but the usual approach is to search for some particularized reason or
ground for finding that the retention of the enrichment would be unjust.").
131. See Gabaldon, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 1436 (cited in note 3) (claiming that depriving a
shareholder of limited liability is necessary to jolt shareholders out of apathy concerning possible
misuses of funds).
132. 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
133. Id. at 174 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976)).
134. Usery, 428 U.S. at 18 (emphasis added).
135. Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1917 (cited in note 3) (contending that
"[s]hareholders who benefit, for example, from intentional dumping of toxic wastes, from
marketing hazardous products without warnings, or from exposing employees without their
knowledge and consent to working conditions known by the firm to pose substantial health risks,
should not be able to avoid the resulting costs simply by limiting the capitalization of their firm')
(emphasis added). The Monsanto and Usery cases use the benefit-profit language to uphold the
retroactive application of CERCLA and the Black Lung law. Hansmann and Kraakman stop
short of a retroactive application of unlimited liability. See Henry Hansmann and Reinier
Kraakman, A Procedural Focus on Unlimited Shareholder Liability, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 446, 455
(1992).
Profit does not necessarily equate with being the best risk-bearer. See note 104. It may be
that the government would rather the industry bear costs than the public treasury, even if
shareholders are not the best risk-bearers.
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recent corporate scholarship, one that builds on the efficient-market
hypothesis that was a dominant concept during the 1980s and another
that relies on shareholder activism by institutional investors, cur-
rently the hottest topic in corporate law. With regard to the market
argument, if liability imposed on shareholders increases, a reduction
in the market price of the company's stock indirectly might cause
management to change its policies. 136 Joseph Grundfest's recent arti-
cle foresees creation of equity-type instruments that are not subject to
extended liability, including futures, options, and other newly created
interests that would be practically unreachable. In such a scenario,
the unlimited liability equity would be held by either remote investors
who are judgment-proof or foreign shareholders from whom it would
be difficult to collect judgments. Use of derivative securities with
limited liability thus may negate any price effect of an extended liabil-
ity rule so that the market will not translate the potential shareholder
liability into increased discipline of management activity.137
The likelihood of dispersed passive shareholders forcing such
action directly is slim given experience in other governance issues.
Even the new-found hope among academics that the increasingly
large ownership by institutional investors will lead to more active
monitoring'38 does not play out in a world without limited liability.
Even the least intrusive form of extended liability, pro rata liability of
shareholders for torts of their corporations, would discourage mutual
funds from holding large blocks of stock since a large, well-financed
shareholder would be a much more attractive defendant than would
many dispersed shareholders.
In partnership law, investors are liable for the acts of others,
but such extended liability occurs in a context in which the partners
will be able to monitor closely the conduct of those for whom they
would be liable. 3 9 Corporate law, in contrast, holds shareholders, who
are presumed to be passive and unlikely to influence corporate man-
136. Hansmann and Kraakman, 106 Harv. L. Rev. at 455 (cited in note 135) (stating, 'In
short, all shareholders participate importantly in corporate control through the market.'). See
also Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1587 (cited in note 17) (assuming for purposes of the article
that shareholder liability will cause managers to act efficiently in taking potential losses into
account and asking if costs outweigh benefits). But see Ribstein, 70 Wash. U. L. Q. at 445 (cited in
note 57) (raising the concern that unlimited liability deflects risk away from managers who are
effectively disciplined onto remote owners who are not, thus reducing incentives for care).
137. Grundfest, 102 Yale L. J. at 392,395,399 (cited in note 78).
138. See generally Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev.
520 (1990); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 10
(1991).
139. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 Md. L. Rev.
80, 104 (1991).
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agement, not responsible for the liability created by others.14° Hans-
mann and Kraakman recognize that the primary incentive effects of
their proposal will fall on shareholders, not managers, 141 an admission
that undercuts the effectiveness of 'the deterrence purpose of their
proposal in light of the smaller impact that passive shareholders are
likely to have on corporate management. Professor Theresa
Gabaldon's recent article developing how limited liability does not fit
easily within a feminist view of society also illustrates ambiguity in
whether to focus on shareholder or management activity. She notes
that the detachment permitted to passive investors by limited liability
is inconsistent with values of caring and connectedness.' Yet her
proposed solution abandons shareholders' liability to focus on
managers' duty to insure. 143
The remote impact that expanding shareholder liability will
have on corporate behavior increases the importance of the alternative
argument that liability should be imposed on shareholders because
they are better risk-bearers. The argument that shareholders are
better risk-bearers, however, faces considerable challenge for a num-
ber of reasons. First, extended liability will have a significant nega-
tive effect on the ability of shareholders to diversify, which in turn
removes their risk-bearing advantage and more generally will remove
the standardized pricing of shares that has contributed significantly to
the growth and development of liquid financial markets for shares.144
Second, large transaction costs are likely to be incurred in a move to
extended liability; these costs include excessive monitoring and eva-
140. See Arden Doss, Jr., Note, Should Shareholders Be Personally Liable for the Torts of
Their Corporations?, 76 Yale L. J. 1190, 1197 (1967) (stating, 'Since these 'passive owners'
[shareholders of publicly held corporations] lack the personal responsibility that close corporation
shareholders have for corporate operations, and since they are unable to affect corporate funding
policies, the equities justifying personal liability are correspondingly less substantial.'); Phillip I.
Blumberg, Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. Corp. L. 573, 612 (1986) (noting that
"[s]uch liability is not only hazardous for investors, but also is incompatible with generally
accepted views of fairness).
141. Hansmann and Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1909 (cited in note 3).
142. Gabaldon, 45 Vand. L. Rev. at 1432 (cited in note 3) (arguing that liability limitations
artificially distance individuals from the real-life effects of enterprises in which they invest, thus
decreasing their acknowledged personal responsibility).
143. Id. at 1448 (concluding that a feminist generally would disapprove of the concept of
limited liability, but, in the face of political reality, suggesting a requirement of adequate insur-
ance with sanctions against management if insurance did not comply with periodic recommenda-
tions of a panel of community volunteers). See also Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1633 (cited in
note 17) (suggesting liability for officers and possibly directors in close corporations for negligent
infliction of economic loss if reasonably priced insurance is available but management opted for
self-insurance through limited liability; distinguishing similar liability for officers in public
corporations who receive little benefit from failure to insure).
144. See Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1600 (cited in note 17); Hansmann and Kraakman,
100 Yale L. J. at 1903 (cited in note 3).
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sion strategies exceeding what now occurs. The expectation of insur-
ance markets expanding to fill in this increased shareholder risk is
unlikely and in any event would pose large transaction costs.145 Fi-
nally, in close corporations in which participants cannot diversify their
financial or human capital, shareholders often will not be better risk-
bearers and overdeterrence becomes a substantial possibility.
Recent case law in the environmental area generally does not
apply the broad liability principles for shareholder liability discussed
above. The expansive environmental liability rulings have been based
on participation in the prohibited activity, not on a desire to distribute
cost to passive shareholders as better risk-bearers.146  The
Environmental Protection Agency's interpretation of the lender
exemption under CERCLA illustrates this distinction.147 In United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp.,14s the Eleventh Circuit took a broad view
of when a secured lender could be an operator under CERCLA. That
court focused on the lender's authority to affect hazardous waste
disposal decisions rather than the lender's actions exercising that
authority. In response to industry concern about such potentially
broad liability, the EPA promulgated rules in 1992 that emphasized
actual participation. 14 The preamble to those rules states,
"Participation in the management-of a facility means .. . actual
participation in the management or operational affairs of the vessel or
145. See the discussion at notes 87-100 and accompanying text. See also Hansmann and
Kraakman, 100 Yale L. J. at 1899, 1901 (cited in note 3). They foresee new types of insurance
developing: (1) a market in retroactive insurance for shareholders who, at the time tort liability
attaches, desire to insure against the contingency that a tort judgment might ultimately exceed
the net value of the firm; (2) portfolio insurance for individual investors that the authors
anticipate would have high loading costs, but which they believe might be available even without
limit by insiders or brokerage houses; and (3) additional liability insurance purchased by the firm
to cover foreseeable tort losses.
146. See notes 120-23 and accompanying text. See generally United States v. Kayser-Roth
Corp., Inc., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that parent liability as operator at a minimum
requires active involvement in the activities of the subsidiary); City of New York v. Eon Corp.,
112 Bankr. 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding mere capacity to influence not sufficient). But see
Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, 1254 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding authority to prevent contamination
sufficient for individual liability).
147. CERCLA exempts from the definition of owner or operator "a person, who, without
participating in the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the vessel or facility." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
148. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
149. See 40 C.FR. § 300.1100 (1992). The more limited approach to lender liability was
driven in part by the recognition that the federal government would pay a large share of such
lender liability because of the savings and loan insurance program. See Jackson B. Battle and
Maxine I. Lipeles, Hazardous Waste 304 (Anderson, 2d ed. 1993) (noting that "spurred somewhat
by the lending community's horrified reaction to the Fleet Factors test, and more significantly by
the savings and loan industry failure, which had resulted in federal agencies holding large real
estate loan portfolios, the EPA construed the lender exemption to enable a lender to conduct a
wide range of activities without incurring CERCLA liability).
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facility by the holder, and does not include the mere capacity to
influence, ability to influence, or the unexercised right to control
facility operations."150
In other contexts, courts have been reluctant to impose liability
on large groups of passive shareholders. One example is the question
of shareholder liability for failed leveraged buyouts in bankruptcy law.
In leveraged buyouts, entrepreneurs get a bank loan, pledging the
corporation's assets as security. They then use the cash proceeds of
the loan to purchase the interests of the existing shareholders at a
premium over the prior market price. When the deal goes bad, as
many of them have done in the last five years, creditors might seek to
recover from several potential defendants: the managers who put the
deal together while ignoring the high possibility of failure, the banks
who provided the money to shift the financial structure of the business
from equity to secured debt, or the shareholders who walked away
with a large sum of money. Courts have been unwilling to go after the
shareholders. 151 The parallel to limited liability is strong. Although
courts have not provided extensive theoretical discussions in their
decisions, the same willingness to let passive shareholders escape
liability appears to underlie these results.
Apart from the particular context of leveraged buyouts, a more
fundamental question is why shareholders should face expansive
liability that other corporate providers of capital do not. A common
refrain of many economic-based analyses of corporate law has been to
de-emphasize the centrality of shareholder ownership of corporations
in favor of a nexus of contracts among various contributors of capital
and other assets that the corporation needs. The widespread adoption
of other constituencies statutes in the 1980s emphasizes a related
issue by requiring directors to consider not just shareholders but a
variety of other constituencies. Why should shareholders bear the
liability and responsibility for the acts of others that other groups do
not? Shareholders do receive the residual gain from the operation of
the enterprise while the return of lenders, employees, or other credi-
tors is usually fixed, but that distinction should not be determinative.
In fact, many creditors will be better able than dispersed shareholders
to influence management; in some situations, creditors may be better
risk-bearers. There are reasons why imposing liability on these
groups would not lead to the appropriate amount of precautionary
150. 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100(c)(1) (1992).
151. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986); Weiboldt
Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 Bankr. 488 (N.D. ]11. 1988).
[47:1
UNPACKING LIMITED LIABILITY
behavior, but many of those same arguments can also apply to share-
holders.
C. Limited Liability in Corporate Groups
When a shareholder is a collective incorporated entity, applica-
tion of the liability rules discussed in this Article becomes more diffi-
cult. Direct liability is still possible for individuals who commit tor-
tious acts on behalf of the subsidiary, but the likelihood increases that
the subsidiary's liability resulted from the acts of an employee who
received direction from someone else in the corporate hierarchy. The
different layers of corporate structure make finding the person who
took the action more difficult. Dispersed power may make it practi-
cally impossible to impose liability on anyone other than the subsidi-
ary or parent corporation.
A parent corporation is like the shareholders in Walkovszky or
Baatz who control the enterprise and also receive the residual eco-
nomic gain but may not have participated directly in the wrongful
activity. Should corporate parents be treated as passive shareholders
or as active participants subject to a broader duty to monitor or su-
pervise? Analyzing the parent-subsidiary cases under the economic
factors discussed earlier in this Article, the case for limited liability, is,
if anything, less persuasive. 162 When the parent owns all or most of
the shares of the subsidiary, no transaction costs will be incurred in
pursuing the shareholder's liability. There is no public market for the
subsidiary corporation's shares, so there can be no adverse effect on
the market for shares. Since the piercing is done to another corpora-
tion, there is unlikely to be any effect on an individual investor's abil-
ity to diversify (thereby distinguishing a typical parent piercing case
from a typical piercing case in closely held corporations when piercing
could adversely affect an individual's ability to diversify). 1'
Yet, despite this less persuasive case for limited liability, courts
clearly are reluctant to embrace the commentators' call for extended
liability. Even in the CERCLA cases in which an argument can be
made that the statute supports extended liability beyond the corpora-
152. This discussion proceeds without distinguishing wholly owned subsidiaries from those
that are not wholly owned. The argument would change for the minority shareholders, but the
focus here is on the controlling shareholders.
153. Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1616 (cited in note 17) (positing inefficiency for extended
liability in corporate groups only when there are efficiencies from the integration of the
businesses carried on by two entities, but those efficiencies do not otherwise increase liability
costs; because it is difficult to identify these situations, he would abolish limited liability for
wholly owned subsidiaries).
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tion, courts have hesitated to reach passive parent shareholders.15 If
the parent is not actively controlling its subsidiary, many courts con-
tinue to treat the parent as a passive investor just like dispersed
passive investors in large, publicly traded corporations. In the words
of one court, specific to the CERCLA context, "a corporation which
wants to put a waste site or past generation site to productive use can
do so by creating a well capitalized, non-fraudulent, separate corpo-
rate subsidiary .... 'There is nothing fraudulent or against public
policy in limiting ones liability by the appropriate use of corporate
insulation."l5
The parent-subsidiary context presents a greater concern if the
collective, intangible nature of the corporate shareholder is used to
confuse those dealing with the corporation and thereby portray as
passive what is really a well-planned insulation of liability and exter-
nalization of foreseen costs. Piercing-the-veil cases relating to parent-
subsidiary groups reflect this concern. Courts are much more willing
to find corporate shareholders liable when there is no substantive
separation, or when the court finds that the parent is the subsidiary's
alter ego. A finding of common directors, officers, or owners alone is
less likely to lead to a judicial finding of liability.15 The differentia-
tion between mere overlap and active control is consistent with the
premise that liability should be based on direct participation or a duty
to monitor or supervise. In the absence of parental domination, the
subsidiary may be subject to the discipline imposed by the credit
markets. That discipline coupled with the existing incentives of man-
agers to insure can be expected to provide a sufficient check such that
additional legal regulation is not required.151 To impose liability in
that instance would produce no increase in efficient precautions being
taken while disrupting some beneficial investment.
Voluntary creditors seeking to be paid back on the assets ad-
vanced to the corporation will evaluate the possibility of hazardous
activity and charge a rate of interest commensurate with the risky
154. See generally notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
155. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings, 675 F. Supp. 22, 32, 34 (D.
Mass. 1987) (quoting Miller v. Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d 769, 773 (lst Cir. 1985)).
156. Thompson, 76 Cornell L. Rev. at 1063 (cited in note 15). Examining only tort cases,
courts pierce the veil in 85.71% of cases in which no substantive separation is shown (12 of 14),
100% of alter ego cases (16 of 16), and 81.82% of cases finding instrumentality (10 of 11). Where
the court identifies common officers, piercing occurs 47.22% of the time (17 of 36), 35.71% for
common directors (10 of 28), and 38.46% for common owners (5 of 13).
157. The law has pulled back in similar situations before. For example, minimum
capitalization requirements were common in corporations codes earlier in this century. The
abandonment of such rules says more about their relative effectiveness as a constraint than about
the conclusion that the law was encouraging externalization.
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activities of the enterprise. The equity owners, and their managers if
the functions are separated within the corporation, have an incentive
to create or agree to policies that reduce the risk and thereby reduce
the risk premium. 15 A firm will not undertake risky activity when the
compensation that must be paid in this way exceeds the benefits.
This protection for tort creditors from the existence of contract credi-
tors would decrease or disappear, however, if a corporation never
enters the credit market, if it does not plan to go back to the credit
market (a "final period" problem), or if its only creditors cannot effec-
tively learn of the risks so as to charge an appropriate premium (for
example, employees or some trade creditors). 59
The participants' incentive to insure creates an alternative
constraint on an enterprise externalizing costs. Managers with firm-
specific human capital invested in a firm cannot diversify against the
risk of business failure as can shareholders who may split their money
capital among various unrelated enterprises. These investor-manag-
ers may prefer to have a limited liability firm insure against tort
claims so as to protect their firm-specific human capital. To the extent
that insurance is purchased, it creates a "contract creditor where none
existed before," forcing the enterprise to pay higher premiums for the
right to engage in risky activities.'60
Taking these last two points together, externalization is more
likely to occur in an enterprise in which the investor-managers have
little firm-specific human capital invested and the firm does not need
to enter the capital markets.e6 These two points help explain why
courts regularly let some parent corporations form subsidiaries to
insulate the parent from liability. Contract creditors and the desire to
158. Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 51 (cited in note
54).
159. Some have argued that externalization is less common than often supposed. See, for
example, Ribstein, 70 Wash. U. L. Q. at 442 (cited in note 57) (noting that creditors, including
employees, will adjust prices to reflect increased risks); Meiners, Mofsky, and Tollison, 4 Del. J.
Corp. L. at 367 (cited in note 52) (claiming that limited liability does not arbitrarily impose
unwarranted costs on involuntary creditors).
Alternatively, other commentators have noted that despite an opportunity to externalize,
managers' sense of professionalism or their individual values and interests will lead to internali-
zation of the harm. See Mark J. Roe, Corporate Strategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1,
24 (1986) (observing that 'ft]he psychology of professionalism does not lead solely to a blind effort
to maximize shareholders' interests. Rather, it is likely to embody a desire to operate the
enterprise well.") (emphasis in original); Leebron, 91 Colum. L. Rev. at 1602 n.115 (cited in note
17).
160. Easterbrook and Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law at 54 (cited in note
54).
161. Many commentators advocate direct regulation of a targeted group to address possible
externalization by these firms. See Ribstein, 70 Wash. U. L. Q. at 443 (cited in note 57);
Grundfest, 102 Yale L. J. 387 (cited in note 78).
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insure influence firms to take an appropriate amount of care. Only
when the parent corporation so controls the subsidiary as to leave
these usual incentives ineffective does a need for a different legal rule
as to limited liability arise.
The focus should be on the set of firms whose contracts do not
cause them to internalize fully their tort costs and those corporations
without firm-specific investment by management leading them to
purchase a sufficient amount of insurance. Would a change in the
legal rule reduce or eliminate the avoidance of liability by these firms?
Given the transaction costs, there is reason to doubt substantial
benefit in corporations generally, but there likely would be benefit in
some particular situations.16 2
In parent-subsidiary contexts, it is much more difficult to de-
termine if the credit markets or incentives from firm-specific human
capital operate specifically on the subsidiary or whether their effect is
felt on the corporate group as a whole. The extent to which creditors
or managers actually separate the subsidiary from the larger group
has spawned a vigorous debate among commentators. 163  Courts,
avoiding the complexity of this debate, sometimes fall back to a
structured analysis, asking if a corporate shareholder is acting as a
mere shareholder in a traditional shareholder role limited to passive
investment or rather has also undertaken the more active role of a
manager.1 64 Such an approach is consistent with the view expressed
in this Article that passive shareholders should not be liable for the
acts of others. However, this does not mean that a parent corporation
should be judged only against the standard for manager liability de-
scribed in Part II of this Article, in which individuals are held liable
162. Ribstein, 70 Wash. U. L. Q. at 431, 433 (cited in note 57) (arguing that the extra cushion
provided by unlimited liability is small, net of collection costs; unlimited liability simply changes
the nature of evasion rather than precluding it). See Dent, 26 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 174 (cited
in note 42) (noting that the "argument that shareholder liability encourages prudence and spreads
the costs of accidents assumes that shareholder liability does not alter the financial structure of
firms...." These assumptions are false.).
163. See, for example, the debate between Landers and Posner, relating to whether affiliated
corporations will be managed differently from independent firms. Jonathan M. Landers, A
Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev.
589, 596-97 (1975) (stating that a subsidiary will be responsive to dictates of owners, who will be
most interested in the overall return on their investments); Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law, 229 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1977) (stating that normally profits of the group will be maximized
by maximizing the profits of each constituent corporation).
164. See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1222 (3d Cir.
1993) (in determining operator liability under CEROLA for a parent corporation, a court examines
whether the parent is a mere investor or is actually and substantially participating in the
subsidiary's management); CPC Intl, Inc. v. Aerojet General Corp., 777 F. Supp. 549, 573 (W.D.
Mich. 1991) (distinguishing "mere oversight of a subsidiary's business in a manner appropriate
and consistent with the investment relationship" from "actual participation and control over a
subsidiary's functions and decision-making").
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for their direct participation in the tortious activity. Parent corpora-
tions who are active in their control of a subsidiary are not the same
as individual officers, whose only connection to the enterprise is their
management job; parent corporations combine control and economic
gain. In addition, the corporate form provides the parent hierarchy
and specialization that permits it to diffuse control in a way that
makes a corporation seem more passive than an individual in the
same position. The threshold for when corporations should be vicari-
ously liable for the acts of others should not be as high as the standard
for individuals who serve only as corporate managers, and the liability
standard should reflect the specific context.
For example, recent federal legislation extends liability for
deficiencies in pension plans insured by the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation (PBGC) beyond the plan sponsor to include the plan
sponsor's "controlled group."165 This broader rule borrows from tax law
in determining "controlled group" and generally includes all persons
with at least an eighty percent ownership interest in the employer and
all persons in which the employer owns at least an eighty percent
interest. 16
It may be that this broader rule is tied to the risk to the federal
treasury from the unique nature of the obligations insured by the
PBGC. Pension plans insured by the PBGC can create immediate
obligations to employees based on past service credit of those employ-
ees, but the plan sponsor can then amortize over thirty years their
contributions necessary to defray those benefits. If a plan sponsor
were to decide after the first few years that the plan was simply too
expensive, the termination might leave the PBGC with liability for
past service credit that had not been fully fumded. 67 Extended liabil-
ity could be justified as based on this unfunded payment concern.
V. CONCLUSION
Applying the learning of recent economic analysis of limited
liability issues to existing case law suggests several new insights.
First, direct participation is an important explanation of liability in
tort contexts. The language of piercing-the-veil cases has sometimes
conflated shareholder liability with that of direct participants, but the
latter basis of liability is now taking on increasing significance. The
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 1362(b), (c) (1988 & Supp. 1991).
166. 26 U.S.C. §§ 414(b), (c), (m), & (o) (1988); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.414(b)-1 through (c)-5.
167. This suggestion comes from Daniel Keating.
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corporate form has never provided a shield for individuals to engage in
tortious acts while clothed in a corporate capacity. In recent years,
this lack of insulation has expanded to include individuals who should
have monitored or supervised others in the enterprise who committed
tortious acts. Similarly, there have been an increasing number of
statutes and cases that remove limited liability from those who violate
regulatory requirements while acting in a corporate capacity.
Separated from the overlap with liability for direct participa-
tion, liability for shareholders based on distributional grounds is much
weaker. Such liability would likely have negative effects on diversifi-
cation of shareholders and the liquidity of shares and would engender
large transaction costs while not preventing substantial evasion of
liability. When combined with the inability of these potential liability
bearers to affect the actions of the enterprise, the insulation of limited
liability should remain undisturbed for passive shareholders.
The continuing puzzle is why courts remain so willing to pro-
vide limited liability to parent corporations in tort cases. The various
arguments for limited liability do not have much impact in the parent-
subsidiary situation. There do not appear to be large transaction costs
to reach the parent corporation. There is no impact on the public
market for shares of the subsidiary. No adverse diversification effects
appear that would lead to overdeterrence or excessive monitoring. Yet
externalization of some of the costs of the business clearly does occur.
Even if piercing would be harsh to a passive parent corporation that
did not participate in the wrongful action, it would seem to be out-
weighed by the harshness to those injured. It may be that these risks
are viewed as remote, so that no extra preventive actions would be
taken if liability were imposed, 168 or that other methods of covering the
injury are more efficient,169 combined with a desire to defer to the
legislature to make such decisions. 70 To the extent that a parent
corporation does not exercise dominance in the manner used tradition-
ally to support piercing, a greater likelihood exists that the parent-
subsidiary structure remains responsive to the usual credit markets so
that a sufficient amount of preventive care is taken and no additional
corrective liability would be beneficial.
168. Alan Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic Sub.
stances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. Legal Stud. 689 (1985).
169. Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 Va. L. Rev.
259, 263 (1967) (observing that "[tihe solution to the industrial accident problem was simply
shifted out of the corporate arena and its modern counterpart, the auto accident, seems to place
no special pressure on the limited liability concept).
170. See, for example, the court's deference in Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 9 (N.Y.
Ct. App. 1966), and in Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1992).
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Unpacking the contexts in which the limited liability question
arises insures that the language of the corporate form, with its em-
phasis on the separate functions, does not confuse the application of
tort principles. This unpacking both provides a means to address the
problem and suggests the direction of the solution. Liability for pas-
sive shareholders is not supported on either risk-sharing or control
grounds. Liability for managers can be extended if appropriate con-
sideration is given to possible overdeterrence. Liability for those who
combine both functions presents the easiest case for departing from
limited liability, but even in this context, nonlegal constraints temper
the application of the legal rule. In none of these applications, how-
ever, does corporate law thwart the application of tort principles.

